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Keegan McMahon: Preparing for Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership: Are Existing and Propo

TELECOMMUNICATIONS COMMENTS
PREPARING FOR TELCO-CABLE CROSs-OwNERsIP:
ARE EXISTING AND PROPOSED REGULATORY SAFEGUARDS

SUFFICIENT TO DETER ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT?
INTRODUCTION

Telecommunications technology is rapidly changing. Television,
telephone, and computer services are converging and creating an information
revolution.1 In fact, the Clinton Administration recently released a national
telecommunications policy statement2 detailing a plan to modernize the
national information infrastructure and create an advanced information
superhighway.'
Two pressing questions confront lawmakers as they contemplate the
future of the telecommunications industry. First, should local telephone
companies ("telcos") be allowed to enter the market for video services, such
as cable television? Second, should the monopoly for local telephone
exchange service be opened to competition?4

As part of its telecommunication policy statement, the Clinton Administration committed to introducing legislation by the end of 1994 that will
repeal the current telephone company-cable television cross-ownership
restrictions ("telco-cable cross-ownership restrictions").' These restrictions

1. National Cable Television Association, Building a Competitive Local Telecommunications
Marketplace: Summary in Brief (Oct. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the California
Western Law Review).
2. Information Infrastructure Task Force, The National Information Infrastructure: Agenda
for Action (Sept. 15, 1993).
3. The policy statement described the information superhighway as "a seamless web of
communications networks, computers, databases, and computer electronics that will put vast
amounts of information at users' fingertips." Id. at 3.
4. National Cable Television Association, Building a Competitive Local Telecommunications
Marketplace 1 (Oct. 1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the California Western Law
Review) [hereinafter NCTA Position Paper].
5. Information Infrastructure Task Force, supra note 2, at 8. The Administration is
proposing Title VII, an amendment to the 1934 Communications Act that would create a new
regulatory scheme for multimedia companies. Vincente Pasdeloup, Telcos, Clinton, Congress
Lining Up on the On-Ramp, CABLE WORLD, Jan. 31, 1994, at 1, 4.
Under the plan, cable television companies could deliver local telephone exchange services
and telcos could deliver video programming services. In addition, video programmers would
have non-discriminatory access to cable television and telco distribution systems. Furthermore,
telcos would not be permitted to buy cable television systems in their local telephone exchange
service areas. Finally, telecommunications companies that offer two-way broadband interactive
switched video services to 20 percent of the customers in their state could opt to be regulated
under Title VII. Rates for these companies would be unregulated unless the Federal

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993

1

California Western Law Review, Vol. 30 [1993], No. 2, Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
[Vol.

30

prohibit telcos from offering cable television services to customers in their
local telephone exchange service areas. 6 By repealing the cross-ownership
restrictions, the Administration seeks to expand competition in the information services market and promote private sector investment in the national
information infrastructure.7 The Administration believes the expanded
competition will encourage companies to invest in building the information
superhighway and to develop new information services for consumers and
businesses.'
While lawmakers and industry experts are generally in favor of repealing
the cross-ownership restrictions, 9 they are concerned about the effect of the
repeal on the telecommunications industry.1 This article considers the
implications of telco-cable cross-ownership and whether existing and
proposed regulatory safeguards are sufficient to deter anti-competitive
conduct. Section I of the article reviews the history of the current crossownership restrictions. Section II examines the benefits of telco-cable crossownership. Section HI describes pending legislation aimed at repealing the
telco-cable cross-ownership restrictions. Section IV explores the potential for
telcos to engage in anti-competitive conduct if the cross-ownership restrictions are repealed. Section V analyzes the effectiveness of existing and

Communication Commission finds the company monopolizes a market where it supplies some
kind of service. Matt Stump, Gore's Speech: Devil's in Details, CABLE WORLD, Jan. 17,
1994, at 1, 47. As of April 1994, Title VII has not been sponsored or supported by a single
legislator.
6. 47 U.S.C.A. § 533(b) (West Supp. 1993). Specifically, the Act provides: "It shall be
unlawful for any common carrier ... to provide video programming directly to subscribers in
its telephone service area, either directly or indirectly through an affiliate owned by, operated
by, controlled by, or under common control with the common carrier." Id.
7. Information Infrastructure Task Force, supra note 2, at 7-8.
8. Id. Although it is too early to predict the scope of the services that will be available on
the information superhighway, consumers can look forward to home shopping, home banking,
interactive television, and access to libraries and educational institutions nationwide. Mike
Mills, Spirit of CooperationBreaks Media Industry Gridlock, CONG. Q., Jan. 15, 1994, at 64,
64.
The information superhighway will allow business users to connect with customers and
suppliers easily and inexpensively, gather competitive data, and improve communications among
employees. Andy Reinhardt, Building the Data Highway, BYTE, Mar. 1994, at 46, 46.
Applications facilitated by the highway, such as video conferencing, could reduce business travel
expenses and encourage telecommuting. Id.
9. Mills, supra note 8, at 64. See also Kim McAvoy, Markey's Goal: Two Wires in Every
House, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 15, 1993, at 26, 26; Kim McAvoy, Markey Invites
Telco Entry, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct. 11, 1993, at 47, 47; Daniel Pearl, et al., First
White House Signal Has Look of a Green Light, WALL ST. J., Oct. 14, 1993, at A6.
10. Kim McAvoy, Telco Bill Divides Cable, Broadcasters,BROADCASTING & CABLE, Oct.
11, 1993, at 47, 47; Geoffrey Foisie, There's Space for All on the Superhighway, BROADCASTING & CABLE, Nov. 15, 1993, at 27, 27-28.

One specific concern of legislators is how to preserve "universal service," the social

compact of the 1934 Communications Act which promises all people access to communications

services regardless of income or geography. Mills, supra note 8, at 67, 68. As part of any new
regulatory scheme, legislators must determine how and when to expand the definition of
universal service in such a way that it includes new technologies which are vital to an

individual's participation in society. Id.
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TELCO-CABLE CROSS-OWNERSHIP

proposed regulatory safeguards designed to deter anti-competitive conduct.
Finally, Section VI argues that competition for local telephone exchange
services is the only adequate deterrent to telco anti-competitive conduct.
I. HISTORY OF THE TELCO-CABLE CROSS-OWNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS"

A. Origins

The telco-cable cross-ownership restrictions are comprised of federal
regulations, federal legislation, and provisions contained in the Modified

Final Judgment,
the consent decree between AT&T and the Department of
Justice. 12
1. Federal Regulations

The Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"), the agency which
regulates both the telephone and cable television industries, first imposed
cross-ownership restrictions in 1970.13 The restrictions were designed to
encourage the development of a cable television industry separate from the
telephone industry.14 At the time, the FCC was particularly concerned with
preventing telcos from discriminating against unaffiliated cable television
operators, who required access to utility poles and underground conduits to

build their cable television distribution systems.

11. See generally Nicholas W. Allard & Theresa Lauerhass, Debalkanize the Telecomnnunications Marketplace, 28 CAL. W. L. REv. 231 (1992); Philip J. Boeckman, The Effects of
RecentDevelopments on the TELCOICATV Cross-OwnershipProhibitions,56 Mo. L. REV. 1069
(1991); Donald J. Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., The Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992: The Triumph of PrivateOver PublicInterest, 44 ALA.
L. REV. 355 (1993); Daniel Brenner, Telephone Company Entry Into Video Services: A First
Amendment Analysis, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 11 (1991); Allen S. Hammond, IV, Regulating
Broadband Communication Networks, 9 YALE J. ON REG. 181 (1992); Jane A. Stmchan,
Untangling the Regulatory and Legal Wires to Telephone and Cable Television Technology, 11
BRIDGEPORT L. REv. 599 (1991); Laurence H. Winer, Telephone Companies Have First
Amendment Rights Too: The Constitutional Casefor Entry Into Cable, 8 CARDOZO ARTs &
ENT. L.J. 257 (1990); Shaun Christensen, Comment, Cable Television: Competition and the
FirstAmendment, 37 S.D. L. REv. 566 (1992).
12. The Modified Final Judgment settled an antitrust suit brought against AT&T by the
Department of Justice. It led to the divestiture of AT&T in 1986. See generally United States
v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), 10'd sub nom, Maryland v.
United States 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
13. JAMES C. GOODALE, ALL ABOUT CABLE § 2.15[3], at 2-70 (1993).

14. Id. at 2-71.
15. Rather than construct their own, cable television operators lease space on telco utility
poles and underground conduits. See generally John P. Morrissey, Comment, Equal Access to
Pole Attachment Agreements: Implications of Telephone Company Participationin the Cable
Television Market, 18 BALT. L. REv. 165, 165 (1988).
Prior to the promulgation of the cross-ownership restrictions, the FCC conducted rulemaking proceedings. Evidence presented during those proceedings suggested that some telcos
were using their control over the utility poles and underground conduits to deter competition.
Some of the anti-competitive practices noted included: arbitrarily refusing to lease space to
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2. The Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984
The FCC's cross-ownership restrictions were codified in The Cable
Communications Policy Act of 1984 ("The 1984 Cable Act"). 16 The Act
prohibits telcos or their affiliates from offering cable television service in
their local telephone exchange service areas. 7 However, the Act permits
telcos to construct cable television distribution systems for lease to cable
television operators on a common-carrier basis.'" In addition, the Act
provides for a waiver of the cross-ownership restrictions in rural areas where
cable television service would otherwise be unavailable and for other good
cause. 19
3. The Modified Final Judgment
The Modified Final Judgment placed additional restrictions on the
Regional Bell Operating Companies ("Regional Companies").' Specifically, the consent decree prohibited the Regional Companies from engaging in
three lines of business: long-distance telephone exchange service, information services, 2 ' and telecommunications equipment manufacturing. 2 The
court approving the consent decree imposed the line of business restrictions
to prevent the Regional Companies from using their local telephone exchange
service monopolies to impede competition in industries, such as cable
television, which are dependent on access to their facilities.'

cable television operators for their distribution networks, charging excessive rents, placing
unreasonable restrictions on the use of cables attached to poles, and pressuring cable television
operators to lease distribution networks built by telcos in lieu of constructing their own. Daniel
Brenner, supra note 11, at 18 n.20.
16. 47 U.S.C.A. § 533(b) (West. Supp. 1993). See supra note 6 for the specific language
of the statute.
17. Id.

18, Id.
19. Whether good cause exists is determined by the FCC in its discretion. Id. The FCC
determined that "good cause" may include "public interest and need showings which may
demonstrate in particular cases the general benefits which could flow from joint operation of
cable television and telephone facilities." 69 F.C.C. 2d 1097, 1110-11 (1978).
20. Under the terms of the Modified Final Judgment, AT&T was required to divest its 22
affiliated local telephone companies. The local telephone companies were grouped into seven
Regional Companies. The Regional Companies (in order of size) are: Bell Atlantic, BellSouth,
Ameritech, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis, U S West Communications, and Southwestern Bell.
NATIONAL CABLE TELEVISION ASSOCIATION, TELEPHONE COMPANY PRIMER

2-3 (1991).

21. "Information services" includes cable television services. Id. at 4.
22. United States v. American Tel. and Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 189-190 (D.D.C.
1982), aff'd sub nom, Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
23. Id.

https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol30/iss2/5

4

Keegan McMahon: Preparing for Telco-Cable Cross-Ownership: Are Existing and Propo

1994]

TELCO-CABLE CROSS-OWNERSHIP

279

B. Recent Developments Affecting the Cross-OwnershipRestrictions
Recent changes in federal regulations, federal legislation, and the
Modified Final Judgment have foreshadowed the repeal of the cross-

ownership restrictions.
1. New Federal Regulations
In the late 1980's, the FCC began to reevaluate the need for the crossownership restrictions. 4 In 1988, the FCC granted a temporary waiver of
the restrictions to General Telephone Company of California to construct and
maintain a fiberoptic cable television system for a cable television operator
in Cerritos, California.'
The terms of the waiver permitted General
Telephone to lease back half of the system's channel capacity to test new

video delivery services.26

Although the arrangement was barred by the

cross-ownership restrictions and did not meet the usual requirements for a
waiver, the FCC approved the waiver based on the potential technological

benefits of General Telephone's testing.2

In 1992, the FCC made an interim move toward lifting cross-ownership

restrictions by allowing telcos to offer video dialtone service' to customers

in their local telephone exchange service areas.29 Although video dialtone

service is similar to cable television service, video dialtone service does not

24. Goodale, supra note 13, at 2-74.
25. Id. § 2.15[4], at 2-82.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 2-83. Because General Telephone financed the construction of the project, the
National Cable Television Association and the California Cable Television Association appealed
the waiver. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed
the FCC's decision and remanded the case to the FCC to explain why "good cause" existed for
such financing arrangements. See National Cable Television Ass'n v. FCC, 914 F.2d 285 (D.C.
Cir. 1990). Unable to justify the financing arrangements, the FCC rescinded the waiver on
November 9, 1993, seven months before it was scheduled to expire. Vincente Pasdeloup, FCC
Pulls Plug on Cerritos, CABLE WORLD, Nov. 15, 1993, at 4, 4.
28. Video dial service allows consumers to dial into such services as video programming,
videotext, video gateways, and video processing. Goodale, supra note 13, §2.15[4] at 2-77.

See also

NATIONAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS AND INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, VIDEO
PROGRAM DISTRIBUTION AND CABLE TELEvIsION: CURRENT POLICY ISSUES AND RECOMMEN-

DATIONS (1988).
29. Telephone Company-Cable Television Cross-Ownership Rules, 7 F.C.C.R. 5781 (1992)
(Second Report and Order, Recommendation to Congress, and Second Further Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking) (hereinafter Video Dialtone Order].
As part of the Video Dialtone Order, telcos choosing to offer video dialtone service are
required to make the service available to video programming suppliers on a nondiscriminatory
common-carrier basis. In addition, the order permits telcos to provide some additional
enhanced, non-common-carrier services to video programming suppliers. These services
include: billing and collection, order processing, video customer premises equipment, and inside
wiring. Federal Communications Commission, Action in Docket Case Local Telephone
Companies to be Allowed to Offer Video Dialtone Services; Repeal of Statutory Telco-Cable
Prohibition (CC Docket 87-266), Report No. DC-2174 (1992), available in LEXIS.
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allow telcos to provide cable television services directly to the subscriber. 30

Instead, telcos act as a common-carrier by connecting an independent video
programming supplier to the subscriber."
In 1992, the FCC also permitted Cox Enterprises, Inc., a large cable
television operator, to purchase a 50.1% interest in Teleport Communications
Group, Inc., a company which provides various telephone and data
transmission services.32 In reaching its decision, the FCC interpreted the
cross-ownership restrictions to apply solely to dominant local telcos,
specifically the Regional Companies."
2. The Cable Television Consumer Protection and
Competition Act of 1992
At the same time the FCC was reevaluating the cross-ownership
restrictions, the cable television industry was facing growing consumer
dissatisfaction with escalating cable rates and poor service qualityY3 In
response to this consumer dissatisfaction, Congress passed The Cable
Television Consumer Protection and Competition Act of 1992 ("The 1992
Cable Act").3 The Act's purpose is "to provide increased consumer
protection36" and "to promote increased competition in the cable television

and related markets." 37 The FCC, the Department of Justice, and other
industry experts recommended that Congress repeal the cross-ownership
restrictions and permit telcos to compete with cable television operators.3"

30. Video Dialtone Order, supra note 29, at 5817.
31. Id. The Video Dialtone Order was intended to accomplish: (1) increased investment
opportunities for the development of an advanced telecommunications infrastructure; (2)
additional competition in the video and communications markets so that free market forces,
rather than government regulation would determine the success or failure of new services; and
(3) a diversity of video services in order to create additional opportunities for consumer choice.
Id.at 5787. However, without assurances that they would be more than a common-carrier
conduit for video programming, telcos have been reluctant to enter the video services market.
Andrew C. Barrett, Shifting Foundations: The Regulation of Telecommunications in an Era of
Change, 46 FED. CoMM. L.J. 39, 52 (1993).
32. Goodale, supranote 13, §2.15[3] at 2-76. Cox owns 50% of the cable television system
serving Staten Island, New York. Teleport provides telecommunications services to the same
area. Id.
33. Id.
34. Hill Enacts Cable TV Law Over Veto, CONG. Q. ALMANAC, 1992, at 171. The
Government Accounting Office documented that since deregulation of the cable industry in 1984,
the rates for cable television service and equipment increased at more than three times the rate
of inflation. Edward J. Markey, Cable Television Regulation: Promoting Competition in a
Rapidly Changing World, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 1, 2 (1993). See also S. Rep. No. 92, 102
Cong., 2d Sess. (1992), reprintedin 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1133.
35. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-609).
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See generally Brenner, supra note 11; Winer, supra note 11. See also Video Dialtone
Order, supra note 29, at 5847; United States v. Western Electric Company, Inc. 767 F. Supp.
308, 321-322 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd, 993 F,2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
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These industry experts believe that competition in the cable television
industry would lower prices and improve service, and that telcos were in the
best position to offer competition to cable television operators. 9
Despite these recommendations, Congress declined to include such a
provision in the Act. Instead, Congress decided to regulate cable rates and
impose horizontal' and vertical 41 ownership restrictions.42 Through
these regulations, Congress intended to foster other methods of delivering
video programming such as: wireless cable systems, 43 direct broadcast

satellite systems,'

and satellite master antenna television systems. 45

39. See generallyAllard & Lauerhass, supra note 11; Boeckman supranote 11; Christensen,
supra note 11; Strachan, supra note 11. Cf., LELAND L. JOHNSON, TELEPHONE COMPANY
ENTRY INTO CABLE TELEVISION: COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND PUBLIC POLICY

9-11 (Rand

Corp., 1992) (Suggesting that cable television operators have an inherent advantage over telcos
in the video programming services market, and that direct broadcast satellite service providers
pose stronger competition for cable television operators).
For more information on direct broadcast satellite service and its threat to cable television
operators see Leslie Ellis, Direct Broadcast Satellite: Cable's Worst Nightmare, CED, Mar.
1994, at 28.
40. Horizontal ownership refers to the share of subscribers served by individual cable
television operators through their ownership or control of local cable television systems. In the
Matter of Implementation of Sections 11 and 13 of the Cable Television Consumer Protection
and Competition Act of 1992 Horizontal and Vertical Ownership Limits, FCC NO. 93-456,
availablein WESTLAW (Oct. 22, 1993), at 3 [hereinafter Cable Television Ownership Limits].
At the time The 1992 Cable Act was passed, the top five cable television operators served
almost half of the nation's cable television subscribers. Id. By requiring horizontal ownership
restrictions, Congress sought to prevent large cable television operators from "creating barriers
to entry for new video programmers, and from causing a reduction in the number of media
voices available to consumers." Id.
The horizontal ownership restrictions established by the FCC prohibit any one company
from providing cable television service to more than 30% of the homes passed nationwide. Id.
at 1. To promote diversity, the FCC permits the ownership of additional cable television
distribution systems, up to 35 % of homes passed nationwide, if the additional systems are
minority-controlled. Id.
41. Vertical ownership refers to common ownership of both video programming and
distribution systems. Id. at 11.
The FCC noted that large cable television operators own equity interests in thirteen of the
top twenty national basic cable networks and in six of the top eight pay channels. Id. By
requiring vertical ownership restrictions, Congress sought to ensure "non-cable affiliated or
competing programmers [can] secure carriage on vertically integrated cable systems." Id. at 11.
The vertical ownership restrictions established by the FCC require cable television
operators to limit channel occupancy by affiliated video programming suppliers to no more than
40% of a system's channel capacity. Id. at 2. To promote diversity, the FCC permits the
carriage of two additional channels, or up to 45% of a system's channel capacity, if the video
programming suppliers are minority-controlled. Id. These channel occupancy limits only apply
to the first 75 channels. Id. Additional channel capacity is not subject to any channel occupancy
limits. Id.
42. Pub. L. No. 102-385, 106 Stat. 1460 (codified at 47 U.S.C. §§ 521-609).
43. Wireless cable systems transmit an omnidirectional microwave signal to homes, hotels
and apartment buildings equipped with directional microwave antennae. The signal is
unscrambled by a decoder box, which is provided in return for a subscription fee. Wireless
cable has a range of twenty-five to thirty-five miles. Until recently, the FCC allotted only a
small portion of the microwave radio spectrum for wireless cable and permitted only two
channels to operate in any given market. Goodale, supra note 13, § 5.02[1] at 5-6.
44. Direct broadcast satellite systems use high power satellites to deliver signals to satellite
dish antennae at homes, hotels and apartment buildings. Id. § 5.02[2], at 5-8.
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Congress thought that once these methods of delivering video programming
services were sufficiently developed, they would provide adequate competition for cable television operators. 46
Since the Act's passage, experts have criticized its effectiveness. First,
they argue that alternative methods of delivering video programming will
never pose direct competition to cable television operators because these
methods of delivery are utilized primarily by subscribers in rural areas who
do not have access to cable television services.47 Secondly, they argue the
Act conflicts with the Administration's goal of creating an information
superhighway because without direct competition cable television operators
have no immediate incentive to construct fiberoptic distribution networks.48
Similarly, unless telcos are permitted to provide cable television services,
they also have no incentive to construct fiberoptic distribution networks.49
3. Lifting the Information Services Restrictions
in the Modified Final Judgment
While the FCC and Congress were contemplating the appropriate
regulatory scheme for the cable television industry, the Regional Companies
were challenging the continuing need for the line of business restrictions. In
1991, the court overseeing the Modified Final Judgment lifted the information services restriction. 0 The court's decision cleared the way for the
Regional Companies to enter the cable television business once the crossownership restrictions are repealed.

45. Satellite master antenna television ("SMATV") systems use antennae and earth stations
to capture UHF, VHF and domestic communications satellite signals and distribute them by wire
to individual dwelling units in hotels and apartment complexes. d. § 5.02[4], at 5-13. SMATV
systems enjoy two significant regulatory advantages over cable television systems. First,
SMATV systems are not subject to the same service requirements imposed by the FCC on cable
television systems. Second, federal law often preempts state and local regulation of SMATV
systems. Id.
46. Id.
47. Boeckman, supra note 11, at 1088-90.
48. Id.
49. Strachan, supra note 11, at 604.
50. See United States v. Western Electric Co. Inc., 767 F. Supp. 308 (D.D.C. 1991), aff'd,
993 F.2d 1572 (D.C. Cir. 1993). Although the presiding judge, Harold H. Greene, lifted the
restrictions, he did so reluctantly. In his opinion he stated:
[Tjhe most probable consequences of such entry by the Regional Companies into the
sensitive information services market will be the elimination of competition from that
market and the concentration of the sources of information of the American people
in just a few dominant, collaborative conglomerates, with the captive local telephone
monopolies as their base. Such a development would be inimical to the objective of
a competitive market, the purposes of the antitrust laws, and the economic well being
of the American people.
Id. at 326 (footnote omitted).
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4. Video Programming as a Protected Form of Speech
A recent judicial decision requires the repeal of the cross-ownership
restrictions on constitutional grounds. The United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Virginia held that telcos have a First Amendment right

to compete with cable television operators.5 1 The court concluded that
video programming was a protected form of speech under the First

Amendment, and that a government grant of a monopoly to telcos is
insufficient justification for the restraint of their first amendment right to
provide video programming. 2
II. THE BENEFITS OF REPEALING THE CROSS-OWNERSHIP REI

CTION

Repealing the cross-ownership restrictions should bring a host of benefits
to the information services consumer. First, cross-ownership will generate
robust competition in the information services market.5 3 Telcos will be

allowed to provide cable television service and cable television operators will
be allowed to provide telephone service.

sion service

monopolies55

4

As telephone and cable televi-

disappear, the price of telephone and cable

51. Chesapeake and Potomac Telephone Company of Virginia v. United States, 830 F.
Supp. 909, 932 (E.D. Va. 1993). For a discussion of the decision as an impetus for legislative
reform see Michael G. Oxley, The Cable-Telco Cross-OwnershipProhibition: FirstAmendment
Infringement Through Obsolescence, 46 FED. COMM. L.J. 7 (1993).
52. Chesapeake, 830 F. Supp. at 918-19. In reaching its decision, the court determined that
the cross-ownership restrictions were content-neutral and, consequently, applied the intermediate
scrutiny test found in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968), to determine the
constitutionality of the restrictions. Chesapeake, 830 F. Supp. at 926.
To meet the intermediate scrutiny test, the statute must be narrowly tailored to serve a
significant government interest and must allow ample alternative channels for communication.
Id. The court found that telcos have alternative channels of communication, but held that the
restrictions were not narrowly tailored to serve a significant government interest and were,
therefore, unconstitutional. Id. at 926, 931-32.
The government asserted two justifications for the restrictions: (1) the promotion of
competition in the video programming market; and (2) the preservation of diversity in the
ownership of communications media. Id. at 927. The court concluded that the restrictions were
not narrowly tailored to the first governmental objective because the restrictions barred entry to
the market "by the one class of potential competitors that has exhibited an inclination to compete
with entrenched monopolists." Id. The court further concluded that the restrictions were not
narrowly tailored to the second governmental objective because the government had other
regulatory alternatives short of a complete ban with which to preserve diversity. Id. at 927-28,
930.
53. Boeckman, supra note 11, at 1088-1091.
54. Id.
55. Cable television systems are considered to be monopolies under two different theories.
The first theory is that they are "natural" monopolies because each individual market can only
support one cable television operator. The second theory is that they are "unnatural"
monopolies by virtue of exclusive franchising agreements with the municipalities they serve.
Such exclusive franchising agreements were commonplace until they were recently abolished by
the 1992 Cable Act. For more information on cable television systems as monopolies see Daniel
L. Brenner, Was Cable Television a Monopoly?, 42 FED. COMM. L.J. 365 (1990); and Thomas
W. Hazlett, Private Monopoly and the Public Interest: An Economic Analysis of the Cable
Television Franchise, 134 U. PA. L. REv. 1335 (1986).
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services should go down, the variety of services available to consumers
should increase, and the service quality should go up. 6
Second, cross-ownership will permit telcos and cable television operators
to form business alliances.5 7 In fact, in anticipation of the repeal of the
cross-ownership restrictions, telcos and cable television operators have
already begun forming business alliances. 8 To date, the most notable of
these alliances is U S West Communication's acquisition of a 25.51 %interest
in Time Warner Entertainment, Inc. 9
These alliances will allow telcos and cable television operators to pool
their resources to speed the construction of fiberoptic distribution networks. 60 These alliances will also facilitate universal service because jointly
telcos and cable television operators could service rural areas where
individually it would be cost-prohibitive for them to do so. 61 Furthermore,
telco-cable cross-ownership allows telcos and cable television operators to
combine their research and development efforts to bring new and innovative
information services to consumers. 2 Finally, consumers will benefit from
the job creation and capital investments that will accompany a competitive
approach to developing the national information infrastructure.'
III.

PENDING LEGISLATION

Two bills which would immediately repeal the telco-cable crossownership restrictions are currently pending before Congress: one house
bill, 64 sponsored by Representatives Edward J. Markey (Democrat-Massachusetts) and Jack Fields (Republican-Texas); and one senate bill,6

56. See supra note 55. See also Stanford L. Levin & John B. Meisel, Cable Television and
Competition: Theory, Evidence and Policy, TELECOMMUNICATIONS POLICY, Dec. 1991, at 519,
523.
57. Telcos and cable television companies could be ideal business partners. Cable television
companies have a large customer base and expertise in marketing video programming services.
Telcos have large service areas, access to capital, technical expertise, and better customer
relations. Levin & Meisel, supra note 56, at 522.
58. Six of the top ten cable television operators have business relationships with telcos.
Chris Nolan, Identity Crisis in D.C., CABLEVISION, Feb. 28, 1994, at 30, 30.
59. K.C. Neel, Cable TV's New Order, CABLE WORLD, Oct. 18, 1993, at 1. Other telcocable alliances include: Southwestern Bell and Hauser Communications, NYNEX and Viacom,
and BellSouth and Prime Cable. Bob Diddlebock, The Bells' Learning Curve, CABLE WORLD,
Oct. 18, 1993, at 10, 11. For a discussion of the implications of these mergers see Barrett,
supra note 31, at 43-53.
60. Boeckman, supra note 11, at 1071.
61. McAvoy, supra note 10, at 47.
62. Strachan, supra note 11, at 603. For examples of the services currently being
contemplated see supra note 8.
63. NCTA Position Paper, supra note 4, at 14.
64. H.R. 3636, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess. (1993) [hereinafter Markey-Fields bill].
65. S. 1822, 103rd Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) [hereinafter Hollings bill]. The Hollings bill is
a comprehensive revision of the 1934 Communications Act and addresses other areas besides
telco-cable cross-ownership.
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sponsored by Senator Ernest Hollings (Democrat-South Carolina). Because
of the widespread goal of lawmakers to repeal the cross-ownership restrictions by the end of 1994,66 it is likely that a compromise bill combining
parts of each of these two bills will be passed by Congress and signed into
law.
The Markey-Fields bill would permit telcos to enter the video programming services market on a common-carrier basis.67 The bill prohibits telcos
from buying cable television systems in their local telephone exchange
service areas, and requires telcos to maintain separate subsidiaries and to
keep separate books, accounts, and records for its telco and video programming services businesses." In addition, the bill requires telcos to market
their telco and video programming services businesses separately, except that
telcos may engage in institutional advertising.69 Finally, the bill requires
telcos to offer 75% of the channel capacity on their video distribution
systems to video programmers on a nondiscriminatory basis.7°
The Hollings bill is similar to the Markey-Fields bill in that it requires
telcos to maintain separate subsidiaries and to keep separate books, accounts,
and records for its telco and video programming services businesses.71
However, unlike the Markey-Fields bill, it does not require telcos to enter
the video programming services market as common carriers.' In addition,
it permits telcos to purchase up to a 5% interest in cable television systems
within their local telephone exchange service areas.7'
IV. POTENTIAL FOR TELCOS TO ENGAGE IN ANTI-COMPETrIvE CONDUCT IF THE CRoss-OwNERSHIP RESTRICTIONS ARE REPEALED

Despite the general desire to repeal the cross-ownership restrictions,
many lawmakers and industry experts are concerned a repeal will lead to
anti-competitive conduct by telcos.74 Specifically, they are concerned about
the potential for cross-subsidization and discrimination against unaffiliated
companies. 75

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 54.
Markey-Fields bill, supra note 64, §§ 201, 653.
Id. §§ 652, 656.
Id. § 652.
Id. § 654.
Hollings bill, supra note 65, § 236.
Id. § 501.
Id.
How the Deal Played in Washington, D.C.: Administration Gives It a Cautious OK,
CABLE WORLD, Oct. 18, 1993, at 4, 48. See also National Cable Television Association, The
Never-Ending Story: Telephone Company Anticompetitive Behavior Since the Breakup of AT&T
(1991) [hereinafter Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct].
75. See supra note 74.
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A. Anti-Competitive Conduct by Telcos Prior
to the Modified FinalJudgment
Prior to the Modified Final Judgment, AT&T and the local telcos
associated with it (collectively known as the Bell System) comprised a
massive, vertically integrated business.76 The company enjoyed a monopoly in local telephone exchange services and also provided long distance
An affiliated company, Bell Labs, designed and
exchange service.'
developed telephone equipment and a wholly-owned subsidiary, Western
Electric, manufactured the equipment. 8
AT&T used its local telephone exchange service monopoly to promote
its affiliated businesses.79 In the long distance exchange market, the
company forced competing long distance carriers, who were dependent on
the company's local telephone exchange, to purchase inferior quality access
at a higher price.8' In the equipment market, the Bell System, which
purchased eighty percent of the telephone equipment sold nationwide, favored
Western Electric as its supplier.8" The Bell System and Bell Labs also
favored Western Electric by giving it early and otherwise advantageous
access to technical data and other information about their equipment
requirements.' Finally, AT&T subsidized the equipment prices offered by
Western Electric using revenues from its local telephone exchange service. 3
This enabled Western Electric to undersell its competitors at the expense of
telephone consumers, who were overcharged for their local telephone
exchange service.'
B. Anti-Competitive Conduct by Regional Companies Subsequent
to the Modified FinalJudgment
Subsequent to their divestiture from AT&T and prior to the implementation of the regulatory safeguards discussed in Section V, the Regional
Companies also engaged in anti-competitive conduct. 5 Some examples of
this conduct included:

76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.

United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 900 F.2d 283, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 289-90.
Id. at 290.
Id.
Id.
Id.
United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 308, 322 (D.D.C. 1991).
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designing technical 8 features
incompatible with the standard
6
equipment of their competitors;
• 87 pricing such features in a manner designed to raise competitors'
10

CoStS;

•
making important and necessary features available only to their
own affiliates;"8
0
delaying implementation of features requested by competitors until
they themselves were ready to enter the market;' 9 and
t
charging competitors' customers more for features than they charge
their own customers. 9°
C. Potentialfor FutureAnti-Competitive Conduct by Telcos
1. Cross-Subsidization
Cross-subsidization refers to the practice of charging the costs of one
business to another.91 The regulatory scheme governing local telephone
exchange services permits telcos to recover their actual cost of doing business
plus a fixed rate of return on their investment, subject to a price cap. 92
Therefore, telcos have an economic incentive to assign the costs of their
other businesses to their local telephone exchange business. 93
Telcos are able to cross-subsidize their businesses without detection
because of their organizational complexity.' For instance, each Regional
Company is a holding company comprised of the local telephone exchange
business as well as a number of diversified businesses.95 Each business is
a subsidiary of the holding company. 96 The costs incurred by the holding
company, such as executives' salaries, can be disproportionately allocated to
the local telephone exchange service, and recovered through the prices
charge for telephone services.' The resources of the holding company that

86. Id. at 323.

87. Id.
88. Id.

89. Id.
90. Id.

91. Strachan, supra note 11, at 614-15 n.75.
92. Id. at 614-17.
93. Id. For an overview of other problems posed by traditional rate-of-return regulation see
1-2 (Rand

LELAND L. JOHNSON, PRICE CAPS IN TELECOMMUNICATIONS REGULATORY REFORM

Corp., 1989); Sutapa Ghosh, Comment, The Future of FCC Dominant CarrierRate Regulation:
The Price Caps Scheme, 41 FED. COMM. L.J. 401, 403-13 (1989).
94. Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 6-7.
95. Id.
96. Id. at 7. For a discussion of eliminating telco anti-competitive conduct by divesting the
Regional Companies from their holding companies see Gail Garfield Schwartz & Jeffrey H.
Hoagg, Virtual Divestiture: StructuralReform of an RHC, 44 FED. COMM. L.J. 285 (1992).

97. Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 7.
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are used to benefit the other businesses are not fully paid for by those
businesses. 98 This gives the businesses an advantage over their competitors,
who must bear the full cost of their expenses." Furthermore, the telephone
customers pay higher bills without receiving either additional services or
improved quality." 0
If the cross-ownership restrictions are repealed, telcos could potentially
cross-subsidize their cable television businesses with their local telephone
exchange service businesses. 101 The practice would be particularly difficult
to detect if telcos and their cable television subsidiaries share distribution
1
facilities. The Regional Companies possess substantial economic power. '2
Their annual revenues exceed those for the cable television, broadcasting,
and motion picture industries combined.0 3 Given this power, the anticompetitive impact of leveraging their resources through cross-subsidies
would be overwhelming. As one legal commentator noted: "the potential
for use of the companies' monopoly power to impede competition is
enormous. This is not so much because the [Regional Companies] have deep
pockets, which they do, but because their pockets are bottomless.""
2. Discrimination in Access to Facilities
In addition to cross-subsidization, lawmakers are concerned that telcos
will discriminate against unaffiliated companies by denying them access to
necessary facilities. 0" As noted earlier, cable television operators require
access to telephone poles and underground conduits to build their distribution
systems."0 6 Telcos could discriminate against competing cable television
operators by denying them access to the poles and conduits or offering them
access under unfavorable terms.0 7 For example, Southwestern Bell in
Missouri is charging pole attachment rates approximately sixty times higher
than the normal cable pole attachment rates if a cable television company

98. Id.
99. Id.
100. Id.

101. Id.
102. Id. at 9.
103. NCTA Position Paper, supra note 4, at 5.
104. Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 9 (quoting Judge Harold H. Green,
who presided over the Modified Final Judgment.)
105. How the Deal Played in Washington, D.C.: Administration Gives It a Cautious OK,
supra note 74, at 48.
106. Morrissey, supra note 15, at 165.
107. Id. at 166. The Utilities Telecommunications Council, which represents 2,000 utilities,
has asked the House Telecommunications and Finance Subcommittee to include a repeal of the
Pole Attachment Act as part of lifting the telco-cable cross-ownership restrictions. Vincente
Pasdeloup, Telco-Entry Bills on Fast Track, CABLE WORLD, Feb. 14, 1994, at 2, 2. The Pole
Attachment Act permits the FCC to regulate the rates and terms under which cable television
operators use utility poles. Id.
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wants to use those poles to provide competitive services, such as alarm
systems. 10
As the court noted in U.S. v. Western Electric Co.: 9 "[T]here does
not exist any meaningful, large-scale alternative to the facilities of the local
exchange networks, and the information services providers remain as
dependent upon those facilities, and those who control them, as they did in
1984."110

3. Other Potential Anti-Competitive Conduct
Marketing is another area where there is potential for telcos to engage
in anti-competitive conduct."'
Telcos possess detailed and updated
information about their customers.
The information is compiled as an
integral part of providing telephone service and is paid for by telephone
customers.1 3 If a telco were to give a subsidiary cable television operator
exclusive or cheaper access to customer information, the subsidiary cable
television 4 operator would have a competitive advantage in marketing its
1
product.
V. EFFECTIVENESS OF REGULATORY SAFEGUARDS DESIGNED TO DETER
ANTI-COMPETITIVE CONDUCT

A. Cost Accounting Proceduresand the Requirementfor a Separate Video
ProgrammingSubsidiary
Because telcos have a history of anti-competitive conduct, the FCC has
implemented safeguards to deter such conduct. "1 The primary safeguard
against telco cross-subsidization is an elaborate system of cost accounting
procedures. 116 This system consists of five principle components: (1) FCC
accounting rules and cost allocation standards; (2) telco-cost allocation
108. Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 13.
109. 673 F.Supp. 525 (D.D.C. 1987).
110. Id. at 564.
111. Strachan, supra note 11, at 619-20.
112. Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 11.
113. Id. at 11-12.
114. Id. at 12.
115. In the Matter of Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Company
Safeguards and Tier I Local Exchange Company Safeguards, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571 (1991)
[hereinafter BOC Safeguards]. These safeguards were originally developed to protect enhanced
telephone services providers from anti-competitive conduct by the Regional Companies. They
were subsequently applied to video programming services by the Video Dialtone Order.
For background information on the history of the safeguards and their application in the
telephone industry see Chris L. Kelly, The Contestibility ofthe Local Network: The FCC's Open
Network Architecture Policy, 45 COMM. L.J. 89 (1993); Robert M. Frieden, The Third
Computer Inquiry: A Deregulatory Dilemma, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 383 (1986).
116. BOC Safeguards, supra note 115, at 7576-97.
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manuals reflecting the FCC rules and standards; (3) independent audits to
determine telco compliance with their cost allocation manuals; (4) detailed
reports by telcos to the FCC; (5) and on-site audits of telcos by the FCC to
ensure compliance with the established rules and standards."1 7
Although this cost accounting system seems on its face to be sufficient
to deter cross-subsidization, it is ineffective for two reasons. First, the FCC
lacks adequate resources to properly audit the telcos. 1ls In fact, the
General Accounting Office ("GAO") noted:
The FCC staff ...

is able to audit each relevant telco account only once

every sixteen years .... The level of oversight [the] FCC is prepared to
provide will not, in GAO's opinion, provide telephone ratepayers or
competitors positive assurance that FCC cost 9allocation rules and procedures are properly controlling cross-subsidy."

Similarly, FCC Commissioner Ervin Duggan said "he has a 'nightmare'
about a 'sixty-story building in Gaithersburg [MD]' filled with FCC
accountants that would be needed to monitor telco cross-subsidies if they
were in the cable television business. " 120
Second, the complexity of telco organizations make it difficult to detect
cross-subsidization.'"I Although both the Markey-Fields bill and the
Hollings bill would require telcos to distribute video programming services
through separate subsidiaries, this requirement only makes cross-subsidization
easier to detect. It does not prevent cross-subsidization from occurring. If
regulatory resources are not available to closely scrutinize telco accounting
practices, cross-subsidization is still likely to occur.
B. Price Cap Regulation
Another safeguard against cross-subsidization is price cap regulation.'2
Price cap regulation is an alternative to traditional rate-of-return regulation,

117. Id. at 7591.
118. Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supranote 74, at 22. See also John Major, Chairman,
Telecommunications Industry Association, Statement to the House Subcommittee on
Telecommunications and Finance (Feb. 8, 1994), available in LEXIS.
119. Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 22 (citing General Accounting
Office, Telephone Communications: Controlling Cross-Subsidy Between Regulated and
Competitive Services 3 (1987)).
120. Id. at 23 (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
121. See Schwartz & Hoagg, supra note 96, at 297-300, describing how NYNEX's
complicated organizational structure permitted it to engage in undetected cross-subsidization for
several years after its divestiture from AT&T.
122.

LELAND

L.

JOHNSON, TELEPHONE COMPANY

COMPETITION, REGULATION, AND PUBLIC PoLIcY

ENTRY INTO CABLE TELEVISION:

41 (Rand Corp., 1992).
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and establishes a formula to provide a just and reasonable rate of return.'1
Price cap regulation is appealing because, in theory, it: (1) severs the
regulatory connection between prices and costs, rewarding telcos with cost
savings achieved through improved efficiency; (2) severs the connection
between profits and rate base, eliminating the incentive to use excessive
amounts of capital; and (3) imposes price ceilings on monopoly services to
restrict telcos' ability to finance predatory undertakings in competitive
markets. 124
Unfortunately, price-cap regulation suffers from two flaws. First,
unless the price-cap formulas are such that monopoly services are grouped
separately from competitive services, they still provide an opportunity to
cross-subsidize." z Second, telcos can circumvent the price-cap regulation
by incurring additional expenses for the benefit of an unregulated subsidiary
and then petitioning the FCC for a revision to the price-cap formula." In
this manner, telcos are still able to cross-subsidize their businesses. 12 At
most, price cap regulation is an administrative inconvenience to a telco intent
on engaging in cross-subsidization.
C. Open Network Architecture"
The primary safeguard against telco discrimination is open network

architecture.' 29

Under open network architecture, 3 ' telcos are required

to provide nondiscriminatory access to basic network services, features, and

123. Id. at 39. Price caps are pricing ranges for various telco services. The prescribed
pricing ranges are periodically adjusted to reflect changing economic conditions. Price cap
regulation permits a telco to adjust the rates for capped services within the prescribed pricing
ranges with little or no regulatory intervention. Ghosh, supra note 93, at 413.
124. JOHNSON, supra note 93, at 4.
125. Id. at 22.
126. JOHNSON, supra note 122, at 40-41.
127. Id. Former FCC Common Carrier Bureau Chief Gerald Brock conceded that the FCC
has a hard time detecting the padding of the rate base. "There has to be some fairly clear
evidence that costs are not fairly incurred . . . . Costs, like an extra vice president, we are
probably never going to detect." Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 41 (citing
WALL ST. J., June 25, 1990, at 12).
128. This safeguard will only be applicable if telcos are required to provide video programming services on a common-carrier basis as proposed in the Markey-Fields bill, supra note 64.
Otherwise, telcos would likely be subject the same horizontal and vertical ownership restrictions
as cable television operators. See Cable Television Ownership Limits, supranote 40.
129. BOC Safeguards, supra note 115, at 7597-7605.
130. "Open network architecture" describes the process of unbundling the various features
available over telephone lines. In theory, open network architecture provides independent
information service providers with more complete information about network features and allows
them to choose the specific features they need. United States v. Western Electric Co., Inc., 757
F. Supp. 308, 319 (D.C.C. 1991).
For an overview of the impetus for and policy behind open network architecture see
generally Kelly, supra note 115, at 104-12. See also Chris Nolan, The Quest for Open
Architecture, CABLEVISION, Nov. 8. 1993, at 28, 29-30.
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functions to their competitors.' 3 ' To enforce the nondiscriminatory access
requirement, telcos must submit quarterly nondiscrimination reports to the
FCC. 132
Proponents of open network architecture argue that it provides telcos
with a strong monetary incentive to permit the use of their facilities. 33 In
reality, telcos have a stronger monetary incentive to limit the use of their
facilities. Telco facility usage costs account for only ten to twenty percent
of the total cost of an information service."3 Therefore, a telco would
earn far more by providing its own information service than it would by
acting as a conduit for another company's information service. 5
Furthermore, adequate policing of open network architecture regulations
is hindered by the same problems that prevent adequate auditing of telco cost
accounting procedures. The FCC simply does not have the resources
available to detect abuses.
VI. COMPETITION IN LOCAL TELEPHONE EXCHANGE SERVICE MARKET

AS THE ONLY ADEQUATE SAFEGUARD TO DETER TELCO ANTICOMPETITIVE CONDUCT

Telcos have the size and financial strength to control any market they
enter.136 They demonstrated this ability to achieve rapid domination in the
cellular telephone services industry. In 1986, 50 percent of the top 20
cellular telephone companies were owned by the Regional Companies and
GTE. By 1992, the percentage of cellular telephone companies owned by
these telcos had risen to 75 percent.3 7 Similarly, telcos have the capability
of achieving rapid domination in the video programming services industry.
Despite the efforts of lawmakers, existing and proposed regulatory
safeguards are not sufficient to deter telco anti-competitive conduct. 3 To
prevent telcos from dominating the video programming services market,
telcos and cable television operators must be on the same playing field. They
must both be regulated3 as
common-carrier monopolies or they must both face
9
adequate competition.

131.
132.
133.
134.

BOC Safeguards, supra note 115, at 7598.
Id. at 7601-02.
Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 12-13.
Id. at 13.

135. Id.
136. Decker Anstrom, President and CEO, National Cable Television Association, Statement
before the House Subcommittee on Telecommunications and Finance (Feb. 2, 1994), available
in LEXIS, News Library, Federal News Service File.
137. Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 5.
138. See supra Section V.
139. Andrew C. Barrett, Public Policy and the Advanced Intelligent Network, 42 FED.
COMm. L.J. 413, 426-30 (1990).
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The first alternative, regulating both industries as common-carrier
monopolies, is counter to the goal of rapidly constructing an information
superhighway.""4 Regulated monopolies are economically inefficient and
generally do not spur development of new products and services. 4' The
second alternative is more economically sound and would further the
development of a national information infrastructure." 2
Unfortunately, local telcos are currently in a better position to compete
with cable television operators in the video programming services market
than cable television operators are to compete in the local telephone exchange
Fortunately, this imbalance is changing. Cable
services market. 43
television operators are creating new distribution networks or are retrofitting
existing distribution networks which will enable them to provide local
telephone exchange services in the near future.'"
If the local telephone exchange services and video programming services
were fully competitive industries, the potential for cross-subsidization would
be moot. The price of these services would reflect the market demands and
the need for rate regulation would be eliminated. As unregulated industries,
market pressure rather than cost accounting procedures, structural separation
and price cap regulation would dictate pricing policies. Furthermore, as
unregulated industries, telcos and cable television operators would be subject
to existing anti-trust laws.145
Despite the logic of equalizing telcos and cable television operators,
neither the Markey-Fields nor the Hollings bills permit a sufficient lag time
to allow cable television operators or other entities to enter the local
telephone exchange services market. The National Cable Television
Association recommends two alternative tests to determine when telcos
should be permitted to enter the cable television market.'"
The first test is the "Effective Competition Test." Under this test, telcos
could not enter the cable television market until they faced effective
competition. Effective competition is defined as either: (1) the availability
of an alternative multichannel video programming distributor or distributors
reaching 50 %of households, and 15 % of households obtaining service from
distributors other than the largest one; or (2) the availability of an alternative

140. Id. at 427.
141. Id. See also Mark S. Fowler, et al., "Back to the Future": A Modelfor Telecommunications, 38 FED. COMM. L.J. 145 (1986); Frank W. Lloyd, Federal,State and Local Regulation
of Video and Telecommunications Information Systems-the Actual and the Ideal, 6 COMPUTER/L.J. 283 (1985).
142. Barrett, supra note 140, at 426-430.
143. Reinhardt, supra note 8, at 56.
144. Id.
145. See generally, Glenn B. Manishin, An Antitrust Paradoxfor the 1990s: Revisiting the
Role of the FirstAmendment in Cable Television, 9 CARDOZO ARTS & ENTERTAIN L.J. 1 (1990);
Eric T. Werner, Something's Gotta Give: Antitrust Consequences of Telephone Companies'
Entry into Cable Television, 43 FED. COMM. L.J. 215 (1991).
146. Telco Anti-Competitive Conduct, supra note 74, at 7-8.

Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1993

19

California Western Law Review, Vol. 30 [1993], No. 2, Art. 5
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
[V7ol.

30

local telephone service provider or providers for 50% of all business and
residential customers, and 10 percent of all customers obtaining service from
the alternative provider(s).147
The second test is the "Date-Certain" test. This test precludes telcos
from being banned indefinitely and provides cable television operators an
opportunity to prepare for competition from telcos. Under this test, if
effective competition fails to materialize, telcos should be allowed to enter
the cable television market after a fixed period of years. The National Cable
Television Association recommends a period of seven years. They base this
recommendation on three factors. First, cable television companies must
have the opportunity to raise capital and invest in the telecommunications
infrastructure before telcos enter the market. The seven year window allows
them time to work through the current transition period and assure lenders
they can achieve earnings on new investments before telcos enter the market.
Second, the seven-year term will allow cable television companies to assume
the expenses associated with new facilities after having depreciated their
existing plants. Third, a similar term was effectively imposed on British
Telecom when England deregulated its telecommunications industry."4
Neither the "Effective Compensation" nor the "Date-Certain" test is
ideal. Both tests are somewhat self-serving and the Date-Certain test permits
too long a delay in telco entry into video programming. However, the tests
illustrate the type of provision that is missing from the Markey-Fields and
Hollings bills.
Without competition to check their propensity for anticompetitive conduct, telcos with their vast resources will eventually control
the local telephone exchange services, video delivery services, video
programming services and, potentially, customer video equipment markets.
Unless an appropriate lag time is included in whatever legislation eventually
passes, several years from now these same legislators or their predecessors
will be looking back and wondering how another situation like AT&T could
have been prevented.
CONCLUSION

Repealing the current telco-cable cross-ownership restrictions will bring
substantial benefits to the information services consumer. It will generate
competition in the information services marketplace. It will spur the
construction of an information superhighway. It will encourage the
development of new and innovative information services such as:
telecommuting, video telephones, and remote access to medical specialists
and educational institutions.
Along with these benefits comes the potential for anti-competitive
conduct by telcos, such as cross-subsidization and discrimination against

147. Id.
148. Id.
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unaffiliated companies. Although there are existing and proposed regulatory
safeguards to deter anti-competitive conduct, these safeguards are ineffective.
First, the FCC does not have sufficient resources to enforce the costaccounting procedures. Second, price-cap regulation does not remove the
incentive for telcos to cross-subsidize their businesses. Finally, open
network architecture is difficult to police and does not create a enough
incentive for telcos to allow nondiscriminatory access to their facilities. The
only safeguard which will adequately prevent telco anti-competitive conduct
is competition in the local telephone exchange services market.
Cindie Keegan McMahon*
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